FREE ESSAY ON BUFORD V, UNITED STATES

BUFORD V, UNITED STATES

Brief of BUFORD v. UNITED STATES 
Certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit 
No. 99-9073. Argued January 8, 2001--Decided March 20, 2001 
TYPE OF CASE. This case has to deal with the certiorari (Latin for "to be informed") from
the United States Court of appeals for the seventh district. This case raises a question
of the sentencing laws. What is the standard of review as it applies when a court of
appeals reviews a trial court's Sentencing Guideline determination as to whether an
offender's prior convictions were consolidated, hence "related," for purposes of
sentencing? In particular, should the appeals court review the trial court's decision
deferentially or de novo? 
FACTS OF THE CASE The trial court decision at issue focused on one aspect of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of career offenders, a category of offender
subject to particularly severe punishment. The Guidelines define a career offender as an
offender with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes.
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ?4B1.1 (Nov. 2000) (USSG).
Petitioner Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery. At sentencing, the Government
conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related, but did not concede that
her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The drug crime (possession of,
with intent to deliver, cocaine) had taken place about the same time as the fourth
robbery, and Buford claimed that the robberies had been motivated by her drug addiction.
But the only evidentiary link among the crimes was that the police had discovered the
cocaine when searching Buford's house after her arrest for the robberies.
Moreover, no formal order of consolidation had been entered. The State had charged the
drug offense in a separate indictment and had assigned a different prosecutor to handle
the drug case. A different judge had heard Buford plead guilty to the drug charge in a
different hearing held on a different date; two different state prosecutors had appeared
before the sentencing court, one discussing drugs, the other discussing the robberies;
and the sentencing court had entered two separate judgments. Petitioner Buford pointed
out that the State had sent the four robbery cases for sentencing to the very same judge
who had heard and accepted her plea of guilty to the drug charge; that the judge had
heard arguments about sentencing in all five cases at the same time in a single
proceeding; that the judge had issued sentences for all five crimes at the same time.
The Court of Appeals found the functional consolidation question a close one, and wrote,
The standard of appellate review may be disparities. 201 F. 3d, at 940. It decided to
review the District Court's decision deferentially rather than de novo. Id., at 942. And
it affirmed the trial courts sentencing. 
LEGAL ISSUE Should the Seventh Circuit Court consider the convictions of the robberies
and drug charge sentence as consolidated for sentencing, and hence related, even if a
sentencing court did not enter a formal consolidation order due to logically related and
sentencing was joint. This case concerns functional consolidation. and decide whether
Buford's five 1992 Wisconsin state-court convictions were related to one another, and
consequently counted as one single prior conviction, or whether they should count as more
than one thus allowing stricter sentencing guidelines. 
HOLDING AND DECISION The Seventh Circuit Court believed that the Appellate Court was
right to review this trial court decision deferentially rather than de novo. The need for
special competence of the district court helped to make deferential review appropriate.
That is to say, the District Court is in a better position than the Appellate Court to
decide whether a particular set of individual circumstances demonstrates functional
consolidation.
In addition, factual nuance may closely guide the legal decision, with legal results
depending heavily upon an understanding of the significance of case-specific details. See
Koon v. United States, supra, at 98-99 (District Court's detailed understanding of the
case 2before it and experience with other sentencing cases favored deferential review);
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 403-404 (1990) (fact-intensive nature of
decision whether to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 made
deferential review appropriate); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 560 (1988) (District
Court's familiarity with facts of case warranted deferential review of determination
whether Government's legal position was substantially justified)
In light of the fact-bound nature of the legal decision, the comparatively greater
expertise of the District Court, and the limited value of uniform court of appeals
precedent, we conclude that the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the District Court's
functional consolidation decision deferentially. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
RULE Under Article 3, section 2 of the United States Constitution, The judicial power
shall extend to all cases in law affecting citizens of states. The 8th Amendment for
freedom of cruel and unusual punishment not particularly sited but understood. 
Bibliography
Certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit 
No. 99-9073. Argued January 8, 2001--Decided March 20, 2001