FREE ESSAY ON CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Many agree that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world ever
came to nuclear war; but exactly how close did it come? The Crisis was
ultimately a showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union from
October 16 to October 28, 1962. During those thirteen stressful days, the
world's two biggest superpowers stood on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. 
The Crisis started as a result of both the Soviet Union's fear of losing the
arms race, and Cuba's fear of US invasion. The Soviet Premier, Nikita
Khrushchev, thought that both problems could easily be solved by placing
Soviet medium range missiles in Cuba. This deployment would double the
Soviet arsenal and protect Cuba from US invasion. Khrushchev proposed this
idea to Cuban Premier, Fidel Castro, who, like Khrushchev, saw the strategic
advantage. The two premiers worked together in secrecy throughout the
late-summer and early-fall of 1962. The Soviets shipped sixty medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) along with their warheads, launch equipment, and
necessary operating personnel to Cuba. When United States President, John
F. Kennedy discovered the presence of these offensive weapons, he
immediately organized EX-COMM, a group of his twelve most important
advisors. They spent the next couple of days discussing different possible
plans of action and finally decided to remove the US missiles from Turkey
and promise not to invade Cuba in exchange for the removal of all offensive
weapons in Cuba. On October 28, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter stating
that he agreed to the terms Kennedy stated, and the crisis ended. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis can be blamed on the insecurity of Cuba and
the Soviet Union. After the United States' unsuccessful attempt to overthrow
Castro and end communism in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Castro was
fearful of another US invasion. The US Armed Forces conducted a mock
invasion and drafted a plan to invade Cuba to keep Castro nervous. As a
result, Castro thought the US was serious, and he was desperate to find
protection. This protection came in the form of sixty Soviet medium-range
ballistic missiles. (Detzer 30-32, 39, 55, 68, 87) 
During his presidential campaign, Kennedy repeatedly stated that the
US had less missiles than the Soviets, contradicting the Pentagon's claim that
the opposite was true. However, during the summer of 1961, when
Khrushchev constructed a wall around West Berlin, the Kennedy
Administration revealed to Khrushchev that the US. did, in fact, have more
missiles than the Soviet Union. What worried Khrushchev the most, though,
was that the Soviet missiles were only powerful enough to be launched
against Europe, but the US missiles were capable of striking the entire Soviet
Union. He worried that if the Soviet Union lost the arms race that badly, it
would invite a nuclear attack from the US. Khrushchev needed a way to
counter the United State's lead. (May 49) 
In April of 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev came up with the
idea of installing medium-range missiles in Cuba. Cuba was close enough to
the United States that the Soviet missiles would be an effective deterrent to a
potential US attack against either the Soviet Union or Cuba. Castro accepted
Khrushchev's offer, since it would protect Cuba and, therefore, solve
Castro's previous dilemma. In mid-July of 1962, the Soviet Union began its
buildup of offensive weapons in Cuba.
The Soviets spent most of the late-summer and early-fall of 1962
ferrying launch equipment and personnel necessary for the preparation of
missiles to Cuba. Since they could not use military ships (for fear of being
discovered) the Soviets used civilian vessels. However, even with this
caution, their actions were detected. As the US monitored the suddenly
increased shipping activity to Cuba, rumors started in Washington. On
August 10, John McCone, director of the CIA, sent the President a letter
stating his belief that the Soviets were placing MRBMs in Cuba. On August
29, a U-2 on a reconnaissance flight over Cuba revealed the presence of SA-2
SAM (Surface-to-Air-Missile) sites. On September 4, to calm the Congress
and public, Kennedy announced that there were Soviet missiles in Cuba, but
that since they were defensive and not offensive, the US had nothing to worry
about. Pressured by Congress, Kennedy ordered another U-2 flight over
Cuba for October 9. However it was delayed until Sunday, October 14. 
After the pictures from the reconnaissance flight were analyzed, the
National Photographic Interpretation Center found what at first were thought
to be more surface-to-air missile sites. A closer look, however, showed six
much larger SS-4 nuclear missiles; each 60 to 65 feet long. They now knew
they had a big problem. President Kennedy was informed of the missiles
during breakfast the next day. It was now clear to him that the Soviets had
been purposefully deceiving him for months. Kennedy immediately
scheduled two meetings for that morning. At the first one, he looked over the
photos. The missiles he saw had a range of 1,100 miles and could hit major
US cities including New York, Washington DC, and Philadelphia. At the
time, the missiles were not yet operational, nor did they have nuclear
warheads, but they soon would. At the second meeting, Kennedy
hand-picked a group of his twelve most trusted government officials to advise
him on the crisis. This group was referred to as the Executive Committee of
the National Security Council, or EX-COMM. EX-COMM included Vice
President, Lyndon Johnson; Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara; Chairman of the JCS, General Maxwell Taylor;
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy; Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon; CIA Director, John
McCone; Attorney General, Robert Kennedy; Undersecretary of State,
George Ball; Special Counsel, Theodore Sorensen; Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Roswell Gilpatric; and Soviet Specialist, Llewellyn Thompson.
(Fursenko 223-224) In that meeting, Secretary Of Defense Robert
McNamara outlined three possible courses of action the US could take
against Cuba and the Soviet Union. The first was "The political course of
action." It involved Castro and Khrushchev getting together and resolving the
crisis on a diplomatic level. This plan was rejected since most members of
EX-COMM thought it wouldn't work. The second plan was to blockade
Cuba to prevent any more offensive missiles from entering. The third plan
was military action against Cuba, starting with an air attack with missiles,
followed by an invasion. Since EX-COMM falsely believed that the missile
warheads were not yet in Cuba, the goal of any action they agreed on was to
stop the warheads from reaching Cuba. 
In order to maintain secrecy, Kennedy followed his planned schedule. 
So far, the Soviets still didn't know the Americans knew of the missiles in
Cuba, and neither did the American public. If the Soviets found out, they
might hide the missiles or launch them sooner than they had wanted. If the
public found out, the nation would panic. Kennedy was in a good mood and
even joked a little while in public, but became very serious when he entered
his car and called a meeting with EX-COMM. Throughout EX-COMM's
discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Especially the Air Force strongly
argued for an air strike. Before the Air Force was done, they had planned a
massive air strike that would have wiped Cuba off the planet's surface, had
Kennedy not denied the plan. After another U-2 flight on the night of
October 17, the military discovered intermediate range (IRBMs) SS-5 nuclear
missiles. Not counting Washington and Oregon, these missiles could reach
all of the continental US 
On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie
Gromyko. This was a strange meeting. Since EX-COMM wasn't sure if
Gromyko knew of the missiles, Kennedy decided not to confront the minister
on the issue. Later that evening, while a dinner was being held in Gromyko's
honor, EX-COMM had an important meeting. During the meeting, a majority
opinion had been reached on recommending a blockade to the White House. 
At the White House, Kennedy liked the idea of a blockade, but couldn't
decide between it or an air strike. 
Kennedy met again with EX-COMM on October 20 to discuss his
decision. He liked the idea of a blockade because it allowed the US to start
with minimal action and increase the pressure on the Soviets as needed. On
the 21st, Kennedy decided to blockade Cuba. In the speech Kennedy would
give to the nation, he would use the word "quarantine" instead of "blockade." 
This was an important detail. A blockade, as defined under international
treaties, is an act of war. A quarantine, however, is merely an attempt to
keep something unwanted out of a particular area. In this way, the US could
have its blockade, but the international community would not consider it an
act of war. Later in the day, another U-2 flight revealed bombers and MiGs
being assembled and cruise missile sites being built on Cuba's northern shore.
(Brugioni 315)
On Monday, October 22, within minutes of Kennedy's address to the
nation, almost 300 Navy ships set sail for Cuba. Military alert was raised to
DEFCON 3 and instructions were given to be ready to launch missiles. 
Twenty planes armed with nuclear bombs were also in the air ready to strike
the USSR
At exactly 7.00 p.m., Kennedy began his speech. He stated, "...I have
directed that the following initial steps be taken: First, to halt this offensive
build up, a strict quarantine of all military equipment under shipment to Cuba
is being initiated. Second, I have directed the continued and increased close
surveillance and its military build up. Third, it shall be the policy of this
nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in
the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United
States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union." 
Kennedy sent a copy of his speech to Khrushchev, who became
infuriated. He was angry at both his military for not successfully hiding the
missiles and the American "quarantine" which, no matter what they called it,
was an act of war. Khrushchev's first response to the speech was to instruct
the ships on their way to Cuba not to stop. Castro also responded by
mobilizing all of Cuba's military forces. 
On October 23, Kennedy ordered six Crusader jets to fly a low-level
reconnaissance mission. The mission, flown at 350 feet and at 350 knots,
brought back amazing close-up pictures of the missile sites. It also showed
that the Soviets were testing the missiles for launch. One of the pilots,
William Ecker, commented that, "When you can almost see the writing on the
side of the missiles, then you really know what you've got." That evening,
Kennedy, backed by the Western Hemisphere, signed the Proclamation of
Interdiction. By the end of the day, the US ships had taken up position along
the quarantine line, 800 miles from Cuba. The quarantine was to take effect
at 10:00 a.m., on October 24. At 10:25 a.m. the next day, EX-COMM
received a message that the Soviet ships were turning back without protest. 
Khrushchev was not yet ready to expand the crisis by challenging the
blockade. This did not mean, however, that the crisis was over. (May
333-336) 
That day, military alert was raised to DEFCON 2, the highest level
ever in US history. The notification, sent around the world, was purposefully
left uncoded so the Soviets would know just how serious the Americans
were. Khrushchev responded to this with another letter to the White House. 
It accused the President of "advancing an ultimatum and threatening that if
we do not give in to your demands you will use force....Therefore the Soviet
Government cannot instruct the captains of the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba
to observe the orders of the American naval forces blockading that island." 
On the morning of October 25, Khrushchev received a response from
Kennedy stating that the US was not going to back down. 
Still attempting to avoid war, Kennedy was looking for alternatives. 
Journalist Walter Lippman suggested a "face-saving" missile exchange. 
Ideally, the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba and the
Americans would remove their missiles from Turkey. This suggestion was
shot-down, however, because government officials in both the United States
and the Soviet Union misinterpreted it to be a trial balloon from the Kennedy
administration. But after a CIA report announced that the quarantine had
failed to halt progress in the development of the missile sites, Kennedy
believed only an invasion or a trade like the one Lippman had suggested
would work. Kennnedy also decided to enhance pressure by increasing the
number of low-level flights over Cuba from twice per day to once every two
hours. 
On the 26th, Aleksandr Fomin, the KGB station chief in Washington, 
hinted that there might be a solution. He proposed the dismantling of Soviet
bases under UN supervision in exchange for a public promise from the US
not to invade Cuba. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, told Fomin that the US
government saw real possibilities, but that time was very urgent, and the
proposal could take too much time. At 6:00 that night, the White House
received a letter from Khrushchev which stated that the Soviet Union would
declare that all of their ships bound for Cuba were not carrying any
armaments, if the US would not invade Cuba. At a meeting between Robert
Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin later that night, the idea of trading Soviet
missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey came into play again. 
Saturday, October 27, was the worst day of the crisis. First, a U-2 on a
"routine air sampling mission" over western Alaska picked the wrong star to
navigate by and flew off course into Soviet Airspace. When he realized his
mistake, the pilot immediately radioed for help. The rescue station operator
was able to give him directions to turn his plane onto the right course. By
that time, however, the Soviets had detected the U-2 and launched MiG
fighters to intercept the spy plane. The Americans also launched their F-102
fighters to provide cover for the U-2. The F-102s, prepared for fighting, had
been armed with nuclear tipped air-to-air missiles. Fortunately, the U-2 left
Soviet air space in time and the two fighter groups never met. Back at the
White House, Secretary of Defense McNamara feared that the Soviets could
have interpreted the flight as a reconnaissance mission leading up to a nuclear
strike, but Kennedy told him not to worry. (Brugioni 455-462)
Around noon the same day, news reached EX-COMM that a U-2 had
been shot down over Cuba. The plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile and
crashed in the island's eastern jungle. EX-COMM had previously decided
that if an American reconnaissance plane was downed, the Air Force would
retaliate by bombing the offending site. Now that it had happened, the Joint
Chiefs, who had been pressing for permission to bomb Cuba, pressed even
harder. General Taylor insisted that, "no later than Monday morning, the
29th" the US should strike Cuba. Kennedy chose not to attack, but to wait
for another plane to be shot down. Then he would order the destruction of
the SAM site.
The next event in that long day was a low-level reconnaissance mission
flown by six F8U-1P Crusader jets. Two of the jets aborted the mission early
due to mechanical problems, but the remaining four continued on their course. 
As the fighters passed over the San Cristobal and Sagua la Grande missile
sites, Cuban ground forces shot at the planes with anti-aircraft guns and small
arms. One plane was hit by a 37mm shell but, fortunately, it returned safely. 
On Sunday, October 28, Khrushchev met with a circle of his advisers
outside of Moscow. At the opening of the meeting, a general entered and
read a statement he had just received that Kennedy was going to make an
address to the nation at 5:00 pm. At that point, Khrushchev feared the worst. 
That address could be the announcement that an invasion was already
underway. Khrushchev was not prepared to start a war, therefore he and his
advisors drafted a letter with the utmost urgency. When done, the letter was
rushed to the broadcasting station. Khrushchev hoped the message would
reach Kennedy before 5:00 pm. The letter read:
Esteemed Mr. President:
I have received your message of October 27, 1962. I express
my satisfaction and gratitude for the sense of proportion and 
understanding of the responsibility borne by you at present for
the preservation of peace throughout the world...
In order to complete with greater speed the liquidation of the
conflict... The Soviet Government... in addition to
previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at
building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the
dismantling of the weapons which you describe as "offensive,"
and their crating...
This message, received October 28, at 9:00 am, effectively ended the
crisis. The reaction among the EX-COMM members was mixed. Most were
relieved, but others, especially the Joint Chiefs, considered the announcement
a ploy by Khrushchev to buy more time. Kennedy, however, knew the
response was genuine. At 11:00 a.m., EX-COMM ordered a halt to all
reconnaissance flights. (May 630-635) 
In Cuba, Castro was furious. Khrushchev had not had time to inform
his ally of the decision, so Castro learned about the agreement over the radio. 
Hours later, and still angry, Castro countered the agreement by saying a true
solution would have included five more points: (1) an end to the economic
blockade against Cuba; (2) an end to all subversive activities carried out from
the United States against Cuba; (3) a halt to all attacks on Cuba carried out
from the US military bases on the island of Puerto Rico; (4) the cessation of
aerial and naval reconnaissance flights in Cuban airspace and waters; (5) and
the return of Guantanamo Naval Base to Cuba. 
Eventually, with the help of the UN, Castro backed down and all sides
reached an agreement. A UN inspection team was assigned to monitor the
removal of the missiles and the demolition of the missile bases in Cuba. 
Then, the Soviet Navy shipped the missiles back to the USSR. The missiles
were sent back on the decks of the ships so that American reconnaissance
planes could count the missiles and make sure that all had been removed. 
Nine months after the crisis ended, Kennedy and Khrushchev signed an
agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This marked the
beginning of what seemed to be a new willingness to cooperate and
communicate. However, on November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was
assasinated in Dallas, Texas. Eleven months later, Premier Khrushchev was
removed from office by communist "hard liners." (Brugioni 572-574) One
can't help but wonder what would have happened if these two men had
stayed in power. Maybe the same two people who brought us so close to
nuclear war, now changed by the experience, could have brought us far from
it.