FREE ESSAY ON GEORGE W. BUSH - JIANG ZEMIN

GEORGE W. BUSH - JIANG ZEMIN

By Ralph A. Cossa 
China seems very pleased with the outcome of the George W. Bush - Jiang Zemin
presidential summit meeting in Shanghai on October 19 along the sidelines of the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Meeting. 
This was not because a great deal was accomplished, but because of Jiang's extremely
modest definition of what constituted a successful meeting. All Beijing apparently sought
was a photo opportunity and a new slogan. Success was achieved on both accounts, with the
Chinese press touting the willingness by both sides to seek a new ``constructive
relationship of cooperation.'' 
This is not insignificant. Both Washington and Beijing were eager to show that relations
were on a positive trajectory after the rocky start brought about by the April 1
collision between a Chinese fighter and American reconnaissance plane and a variety of
other contentious issues, including continuing American arms sales to Taiwan. The mere
fact that President Bush took time out from commanding his war on terrorism to travel to
China was seen as an important signal, even if accumulating international support for his
anti-terrorism campaign remained a key Bush agenda item during the abbreviated visit. 
And, slogans are important to China. The operative slogan prior to the APEC visit was
candidate Bush's ``strategic competitor'' label; a phrase generally avoided by
administration spokesmen after January 20th, but still featured prominently in the press
when describing Sino-U.S. relations. As long as Bush was willing to state in Shanghai
that he sought a ``constructive, and cooperative'' relationship with China _ which he did
(although he added the word ``candid'') _ Beijing was prepared to declare the visit a
major success. 
What Jiang Zemin was apparently not prepared to do during his first face-to-face visit
with the new American president (they have had several phone conversations) was attempt
to move Sino-U.S. relations to a higher level, as his Russian counterpart, Vladimir
Putin, clearly has done. While the Bush-Jiang meeting was described as ``cordial'' and
``friendly,'' the personal chemistry exhibited from the onset between Bush and Putin was
nowhere to be found. In Shanghai, Bush and Putin took advantage of their third
face-to-face meeting to move U.S.-Russian relations even closer _ one Russian diplomat
described the meeting as creating favorable conditions for ``forming a new framework for
strategic relations'' between Washington and Moscow. 
President Putin sent strong signals that Russia is ready to modify or ``stretch'' the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty to address U.S. security concerns. His flexibility was
quickly rewarded by Washington's announcement on October 25 that it was delaying testing
of those elements of its missile defense system that could violate the Treaty. Meanwhile,
both sides also seemed closer to an agreement over deeper cuts in their respective
nuclear arsenals; an arms control breakthrough likely to be formally announced during
Putin's visit to Bush's Crawford, Texas ranch in November. China, by contrast, remains
generally inflexible on the issue of missile defense and clearly disappointed Washington
by its unwillingness to break the standoff over implementation of a non-proliferation
agreement signed with the Clinton administration last year. 
This is not to say that Washington was dissatisfied with the outcome of the Jiang summit.
The Bush team also had relatively low expectations regarding what could be
accomplished.But they did appear genuinely disappointed. While Bush did receive a Chinese
endorsement of his war against terrorism and a commitment from Beijing to cooperate on
stemming financial flows to terrorists, Jiang avoided endorsing the on-going Afghanistan
campaign and felt compelled to repeatedly stress his caveats about avoiding innocent
casualties _ an American objective, but one that is impossible to 100 percent achieve _
and ensuring continuing UN Security Council endorsement (a forum where China enjoys veto
authority). 
President Jiang also expressed support for the establishment of a medium- and long-term
mechanism for anti-terrorism cooperation between China and the U.S. However, little in
the way of useful, operationally-oriented intelligence information sharing has yet to
materialize and China seems most intent on ensuring that any international war on
terrorism includes condemnation of Islamic Uighur separatists in China's western Xinjiang
province. Washington seems somewhat more sympathetic (or at least tolerant) toward
China's terrorist concerns (and similar Russian concerns over Islamic separatist activity
in Chechnya), although here Bush had a caveat of his own: ``The war on terrorism,'' Bush
asserted in Shanghai, ``must never be an excuse to persecute minorities.'' (This is a
message Bush has also delivered at home, aimed at preventing a backlash against America's
Muslim community.) 
Secretary of State Colin Powell (nicely echoing a sentiment expressed previously in this
column) noted in Shanghai that, as far as U.S.-Russian relations were concerned, ``not
only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also over.'' Meanwhile, Sino-U.S.
relations still seem largely mired in what the Chinese have described in another context
as a ``Cold War mentality,'' with both sides apparently willing to settle for
considerably less. As Presidents Bush and Putin start working toward the establishment of
a post post-Cold War new world order, Beijing increasingly runs the risk of being left
behind.