FREE ESSAY ON RISING MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL SALARIES, AND THE

RISING MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL SALARIES, AND THE

Rising Major League Baseball Salaries, and the
Economic Effect it has on Competition and the Consumer.
As long has there has been business, Management and Labor have warred against each other
for a bigger piece of the pie. Major League Baseball is no different. In the early years
of professional baseball the owners controlled the salaries of the players and decided
where they could play and what they would be paid. The players were bound to their team
by the Reserve Clause that stated, the services of a player will be reserved exclusively
for that team for the next season. This resulted in keeping the player's salaries
artificially low because the players were not allowed to offer their services to any
other team. The Reserve Clause was in effect for more than One Hundred years of baseball
history. It was challenged several times but the owners had won every time, until in 1970
when the St. Louis Cardinals traded outfielder Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies.
Flood refused to play for the Phillies and sued to become a free-agent. Flood's case was
in court for several years going all the way to the Supreme Court. He was never able to
play in the Major League again. While he did not win his case, he laid the groundwork for
a later case that involved two pitchers, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally who filed a
grievance against the league contending that, because they didn't sign contracts with
their previous teams they were free agents. The owners and the Players Association agreed
to submit to binding, impartial, arbitration in order to settle this case. On December
23, 1975 the arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled in favor of the players and the Reserve Clause
was broken, and the era of free agency began in the Major Leagues. In 1976 when free
agency began the average player salary was only $52 thousand dollars, but it has
increased steadily ever since. By 1990 the average salary for a Major League Baseball
player had risen to $589 thousand dollars. This Year baseball will start the 2001 season
with an average player salary of more than $2 million, about 40 times higher than the
typical wage in 1976 when free agency began. 
Average Major League Player Salaries 1976-2000
Year Average Increase/decrease Median1976 $52,300 --- *1977 74,000 41.49% *1978 97,800
32.16% *1979 121,900 24.64% *1980 146,500 20.18% *1981 196,500 34.13% *1982 245,000
24.68% *1983 289,000 17.96% 207,5001984 325,900 12.77% 229,7501985 368,998 13.22%
265,8331986 410,517 11.25% 275,0001987 402,579 -1.93% 235,0001988 430,688 6.98%
235,0001989 489,539 13.66% 280,0001990 589,483 20.42% 350,0001991 845,383 43.41%
412,0001992 1,012,424 19.76% 392,5001993 1,062,780 4.97% 371,5001994 1,154,486 8.63%
450,0001995 1,094,440 -5.20% 275,0001996 1,101,455 0.64% 300,0001997 1,314,420 19.33%
400,0001998 1,377,196 4.78% 
The constant rise in player's salaries has created huge disparity in the overall, total
payrolls of Major League teams, and it is getting bigger every year. In 1988 the New York
Yankees had the highest team payroll at $21.5 million dollars and the Seattle Mariners
payroll was the lowest at $6.5 million. The difference between the highest and the lowest
was just $15 million dollars, but by the 2000 season the difference had increased to
$97.6 million dollars. The Yankees again had the highest payroll at $113.4 million, and
the Minnesota Twins payroll was the lowest at $15.8 million. Seventeen other teams had
payrolls that were at least 50% less than the Yankees. This disparity has created a
situation that has made it very hard for the poorer, small, market teams to compete for
players and championships. In 1999 the eight teams that made the playoffs, the New York
Yankees, Texas Rangers, Atlanta Braves, Cleveland Indians, Boston Red Sox, New York Mets,
Arizona Diamondbacks, and Houston Astros, all ranked in the top ten in total payroll.
Since the strike, in 1994, every playoff team except for the Houston Astros, in 1997, has
been in the top half of the league in total payroll. The year 2000 was an exception to
that rule. In 2000 the Chicago White Sox were able to win the American League Central
Division with a payroll of just $36.98 million, and the Oakland Athletics won the A.L.
West with a payroll of $32.17 million.
The Highest and Lowest Payrolls 1988-2000
Year High Low
1988 N.Y. Yankees $21.5 Seattle Mariners $6.5
1989 N.Y. Mets $20.2 Philadelphia Phillies $7.8
1990 K.C. Royals $23.8 Baltimore Orioles $6.9
1991 Oakland Athletics $40.1 Houston Astros $10.1
1992 Toronto Blue Jays $49.8 Cleveland Indians $8.2
1993 Toronto Blue Jays $52.2 San Diego Padres $11.2
1994 N.Y. Yankees $48.3 San Diego Padres $12.1
1995 N.Y. Yankees $57.6 N.Y. Mets $11.4
1996 N.Y. Yankees $60.3 Milwaukee Brewers $9.8
1997 N.Y. Yankees $69.4 Oakland Athletics $7.1
1998 Baltimore Orioles $73.8 Montreal Expos $8.3
1999 N.Y. Yankees $91.9 Florida Marlins $13.6
2000 N.Y. Yankees $113.4 Minnesota Twins $15.8
Dollars in millions
The above chart shows the Highest and Lowest team payrolls since 1988. The difference
between the highest and lowest number in the lowest payroll column is only $9.3 million,
but in the highest payroll column it is $92.4 million. This shows the tremendous
difference there is between the rich clubs and the poor ones. In 1998 the Montreal Expos'
payroll was $8.3 million and they had an income of $40 million dollars, but in contrast
to the Expos, the Yankees and the Orioles had revenues of about $150 million each and
payrolls of nearly $74 million. Five players; Gary Sheffield ($14,936,667), Albert Belle
($10,000,000), Greg Maddux ($9,600,000), Mark McGwire ($8,928,354) and Barry Bonds
($8,916,667) each earned more than the entire Expos payroll. This is a dramatic example
of the competitive imbalance that exists and is rapidly growing within Major League
Baseball. 
During the early 1990's, the baseball owners became very concerned with the financial
situation of baseball and the economic disaster that they claimed was looming if
something was not done to control the rising player salaries, and address the competitive
and financial imbalance that was becoming a concern for the owners and threatened to ruin
the smaller market clubs. The owners believed that baseball's financial situation was out
of control. So, in 1994 the owners decided to go to war with the Major League Player's
Association in order to pursue a hard salary cap that would help to hold down the rising
tide of player's salaries. The two opposing groups became locked up in a collective
bargaining stalemate that resulted in the players going on strike on August 12, 1994
after being threatened by the owners with a lockout. The strike wiped out two months of
the '94 season and caused the cancellation of the World Series for the first time in 90
years. 
Before the strike Major League Baseball was enjoying its best season ever in game
attendance and baseball's television ratings were at their highest levels in ten years.
There were players challenging some of baseball's biggest records and the Pennant races
were very competitive even in small market towns like Montreal and Seattle. In the
1950's, before free agency, there were 16 teams in Major League Baseball, but by the mid
1990's the Major Leagues had grown to include 30 teams. Having so many teams has made it
increasingly difficult for the owners to agree on a homogenous agenda. The inability of
the owners to agree on an agenda resulted in the sports labor movement being able to
shift the balance of power decidedly in the favor of the players. The owners had gone to
war to get the players to agree to a hard salary cap, but by the time the owners had come
to an agreement about what should be done to address the financial problems facing
baseball, the players had already reached a level of combined wealth that allowed them to
hold out indefinitely against the new economic system the owners wanted to put into place
in 1994. Because of the bargaining power of the players the owners were unable to get the
salary cap they wanted, instead they were forced to accept a watered-down luxury tax that
penalized the teams with the highest payrolls and modestly subsidized baseball's poorest
teams. The tax has had some deterrent effect on the spending of some teams. There have
been some clubs that have chosen not to sign some high-priced players to avoid paying
into the revenue-sharing pool set up by the luxury tax. But, the plan has done nothing to
close the gap between the richest and poorest clubs in the Major Leagues. The New York
Yankees generate $60 million dollars in local television broadcast revenue, and they have
not blinked at paying $5 million extra to field the best team in baseball. Also, teams
like the Braves and Orioles, with their new high-revenue ballparks, have not hesitated to
run up the tab to stay in contention year after year. 
If the economics of baseball were out of control in 1994, then today they are really a
run away train. Back in 1994 the top payrolls were about $30 million. The Atlanta Braves
paid the nucleus of their great pitching staff, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, and John
Smoltz, a total of $11 million, and the owners were bemoaning the six-year, $43 million
contract the San Francisco Giants signed with Barry Bonds that made him the highest-paid
player in the game. That seems small in comparison to many of the deals that have been
signed since the end of the strike, under the new collective bargaining agreement. In
1998 there was little uproar when The New York Mets signed Mike Piazza to a seven-year,
$91 million contract, and that same year the Yankees gave Bernie Williams $87.5 million
for seven years and the Anaheim Angels signed Mo Vaughn for seven years and $80 million.
Then in 1999, the Los Angeles Dodgers signed pitcher Kevin Brown to a seven-year $115
million contract that sent alarms throughout the baseball world. The very next year the
Dodgers signed outfielder Shawn Green to an $84 million dollar contract. That means the
Dodgers will pay two players an average of $29 million a year for the next six years.
That is more the 1999 payrolls of seven teams. Today Maddux, Glavine, and Smoltz combine
to account for over $40 million in salary per year, which was more than the entire
payroll of eleven teams in 1999. In 2000 the highest payroll is well over $100 million,
and several others are approaching the $100 million dollar level, and they are getting
bigger every year.
2000 Major League Baseball Team Payrolls
Team Total Payroll
1. New York Yankees $113,365,877
2. Atlanta Braves $95,010,734
3. Los Angeles Dodgers $94,224,580
4. Boston Red Sox $93,866,322
5. New York Mets $89,745,275
6. Arizona Diamondbacks $80,756,96
7. Cleveland Indians $78,717,979
8. St. Louis Cardinals $72,376,177
9. Seattle Mariners $62,552,802
10. Texas Rangers $61,359,492
11. Detroit Tigers $60,601,934
12. Baltimore Orioles $59,215,354
13. Anaheim Angels $58,739,880
14. Colorado Rockies $56,049,523
15. Tampa Bay Devil Rays $55,157,593
16. San Diego Padres $54,675,799
17. Toronto Blue Jays $54,551,593
18. San Francisco Giants $54,235,841
19. Houston Astros $51,999,461
20. Chicago Cubs $51,078,366
21. Chicago White Sox $36,944,286
22. Philadelphia Phillies $36,683,832
23. Cincinnati Reds $35,134,339
24. Milwaukee Brewers $33,765,388
25. Oakland Athletics $32,693,833
26. Pittsburgh Pirates $31,939,336
27. Montreal Expos $27,970,273
28. Florida Marlins $25,864,697
29. Kansas City Royals $24,468,440
30. Minnesota Twins $15,822,000 
Totals are based on rosters as of August 31,2000.
Year after year baseball owners keep saying that the game is nearing economic collapse,
teams are losing money, the industry is $2 billion dollars in debt, drowning in its own
red ink, and there is a skyrocketing financial and competitive imbalance between big and
small market clubs. The Commissioner Bud Selig says that the game needs major changes in
the way its financial affairs are handled, and that baseball cannot continue down the
path it is presently on. But, while they say one thing they seem to be doing another,
teams still are continuing to sign players to bigger and bigger contracts at an
ever-increasing rate. In October of 2000 Carlos Delgado was signed to a new record
setting deal that pays, the Toronto 1st Baseman, an average of $17 million per year over
six years. That deal raised the annual salary record from $15 million to $17 million.
Which is an increase of 12 percent over the previous high salary set by Kevin Brown of
the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1999. Just Eight weeks later, during a three-day period at the
end of December 2000, came $533 million worth of player contracts for just three players.
Pitcher Mike Hampton signed a record seven-year $123.8 million contract with the New York
Mets. Hampton's record lasted less than two full days as the biggest deal in baseball
history, before the Boston Red Sox signed outfielder Manny Ramirez to a nine-year $162
million contract that raised a players salary to $18 million dollars per year for the
first time ever. But, those deals paled in comparison to the deal that was signed the
very next day by shortstop Alex Rodriguez. The Texas Rangers signed the twenty-five year
old to a ten-year, $252 million dollar contract that totally shattered the previously
held conception of any kind of restraint on players' salaries. Consider that in 1990,
just ten years ago, the highest paid player was Will Clark the 1St Baseman for the San
Francisco Giants, and he was paid the comparatively small amount of $3.75 million dollars
per year. Rodriguez now makes almost seven times what Will Clark made in 1990.
Rodriguez's deal, which pays him an average of $25.2 million dollars per year, beats the
previous annual record of $18 million by an incredible 28 percent. Historically, each new
record deal has rarely topped the previous one by more than 20 percent, but this deal
pays Rodriguez nearly time and a half of what the next highest paid player, Manny
Ramirez, makes. The total value of the contract is $2 million more than the Texas Rangers
owner, Tom Hicks, and his partners paid for the franchise just three years ago. Rodriguez
is not the only player with a contract that is worth more than some franchises. Mike
Hampton's $123.8 million contract with the Colorado Rockies is worth more than three
entire franchises. Manny Ramirez's new $162 million contract with the Boston Red Sox is
worth more than six franchises, and Alex Rodriguez's $252 million contract is worth more
than the value of eighteen franchises, more than twice the value of four franchises, and
is almost three times the value of the League's poorest franchise the Montreal Expos.
2000 Major League Baseball Franchise Values (in millions).
1. New York Yankees $548 
2. Atlanta Braves $388 
3. Cleveland Indians $364 
4. Baltimore Orioles $347 
5. Los Angeles Dodgers $325 
6. New York Mets $314 
7. Colorado Rockies $305 
8. Texas Rangers $294 
9. Seattle Mariners $290 
10. Boston Red Sox $284 
11. Houston Astros $280 
12. Arizona Diamondbacks $268 
13. Chicago Cubs $242 
14. San Francisco Giants $237 
15. St Louis Cardinals $219 
16. Detroit Tigers $200 
17. San Diego Padres $197 
18. Anaheim Angels $195 
19. Cincinnati Reds $175 
20. Milwaukee Brewers $167 
21. Chicago White Sox $166 
22. Tampa Bay Devil Rays $163 
23. Toronto Blue Jays $162 
24. Pittsburgh Pirates $161 
25. Philadelphia Phillies $150 
26. Oakland Athletics $134 
27. Florida Marlins $125 
28. Kansas City Royals $122 
29. Minnesota Twins $91 
30. Montreal Expos $89 
League Average $233 
With players now worth more than many franchises, and player salaries that are still
rising every year it has created a situation that makes generating revenue a higher
priority than ever before, and the gap between the rich teams and the poor ones keeps
getting bigger. Herk Robinson, general manager of the Kansas City Royals said this about
the latest round of player signings "The hole between us and the big revenue clubs just
got a little deeper didn't it?" The Royals ended the 2000 season with a $24.5 million
payroll, which is $700,000 less than Alex Rodriguez's average annual salary. Robinson
goes on to say, "I can't see anything beneficial about these signings at all, and the
industry as a whole can't support them. There is no doubt that it will deflate the fans
here a bit, and make it harder for us to keep our guys."
The financial and competitive imbalance that exists between the small-market teams and
the large-market teams has been created and fed by a disparity in revenue. It is not so
much a question of the size of the market, but rather the amount of revenue that the team
can generate within its local market. Some of the biggest cities in America like
Minneapolis Minnesota, Oakland California and Miami Florida are considered small markets
while cities that are of comparable size are considered large markets like St. Louis, San
Francisco, and Houston. The real difference between these cities is the amount of revenue
the teams can generate. Teams generate revenue through ticket sales, merchandise, local
television revenues, advertising, and official sponsorships as well as various other
revenue producing activities. The major difference between the low revenue clubs and the
high revenue clubs is revenue generated by ticket sales and local television revenues.
Television revenues vary widely according to the individual markets, but the teams that
seem to do the best with local television revenues are the teams that are perennially
competitive. The New York Yankees, winners of four of the last five World Series
Championships, receive local television revenues of close to $60 million per year. On the
other hand some of the small market teams receive less than $10 million per year from
local television. Another major factor that separates the high revenue franchises from
the low revenue clubs is ticket revenue and it is not just because the large market teams
charge higher prices for their tickets. The large market teams do charge more for their
tickets, but they also sell more tickets because they put a better product on the field.
It is all a vicious cycle that helps the rich clubs get richer and keeps the poor teams
perpetually poor. However, there is a way out of the revenue cellar that is helping more
small market teams gain a solid foothold towards becoming competitive. These teams are
building new fan friendly, old-style stadiums that give the fans more than just a
ballgame but instead an entire entertainment experience for the whole family. These
stadiums have museums, restaurants, swimming pools, video game arcades, and specialty
shops. The movement towards new retro-style ballparks started in Baltimore in 1992 when
the Oriole opened Oriole Park at Camden Yards. It was an instant success that has sold
out more than eighty percent of the games that have been played there, and the ballpark
has revitalized that entire downtown area of Baltimore. Similar results have been seen in
cities like Cleveland Ohio, Houston Texas, Arlington Texas, Detroit Michigan, Seattle
Washington and San Francisco California which have all opened new ballparks in the last
few years. Between 1995 and 1999 the San Francisco Giants have had aggregate operating
losses of $97 million. Last year they moved into Pac Bell Park and the value of the
franchise rose 12 percent to $237 million, and their stadium revenues increased by 250
percent over the previous year. All of these new stadiums have helped these teams to
become more competitive by raising their revenues and creating excitement for the fans
and the city the team plays in. Other cities like Milwaukee Wisconsin and Cincinnati Ohio
are opening new ballparks this season and hope to enjoy the same renaissance that other
cities have enjoyed. 
However, all is not just roses for the teams with the highest revenues and the newest
ballparks. Baseball has mortgaged its future with $3.7 billion worth of guaranteed
players salaries over the next six years. Last season 18 Major League teams lost money,
and two-thirds are expected to lose money this year. One of the major ways teams have
decided to try to stem the tide of player's salaries and operating costs is to raise the
price of tickets. Every Major League team has raised ticket prices at least once in the
past three years, and eighteen teams have raised them more than once during that time.
The price for the players continues to get higher and that subsequently affects the price
of the tickets that are purchased by the consumers, but the consumers are becoming
increasingly resentful of the paychecks received by the players, because they are
subsequently forced to pay more and more to go to a game. 
Team-by-team low and high ticket prices for 1999, and average ticket prices for 1997,
1998, and 1999.
AMERICAN LEAGUE
Low-high '99 avg '98 avg. '97 avg. WESTAnaheim $2-$44 $13.35 $12.26 $10.26 Oakland $5-$26
$11.00 $10.50 $10.50 Seattle $5-$28 $15.71 $14.07 $13.40 Texas $2-$30 $19.40 $16.07
$13.28 CENTRALChicago $10-$22 $16.66 $16.66 $16.12 Cleveland $6-$30 $19.05 $17.35 $13.27
Detroit $5-$25 $12.23 $10.40 $10.40 Kansas City $7-$17 $12.50 $11.12 $9.65 Minnesota
$4-$19 $11.00 $11.00 $10.33 EASTBaltimore $7-$35 $19.77 $18.02 $15.66 Boston $12-$35
$23.84 $19.98 $17.72 New York $8-$29 $21.00 $15.15 $16.27 Tampa Bay $1.50-$22 $16.02
$14.25 N/A Toronto $6-$40 $18.78 $16.00 $14.86 NATIONAL LEAGUE Low-high '99 avg. '98 avg.
'97 avg. WESTArizona $1-$50 $16.48 $14.70 N/AColorado $1-$30 $14.55 $14.55 $11.38 Los
Angeles $6-$14 $13.67 $12.00 $11.16 San Diego $5-$18 $11.24 $11.35 $10.59 San Francisco
$2.50-$24 $20.86 $18.50 $10.13 CENTRALChicago $6-$21 $15.33 $14.63 $14.63 Cincinnati
$3-$9 $9.70 $8.37 $8.37 Houston $1-$26 $11.88 $10.70 $10.45 Milwaukee $5-$25 $14.00
$14.00 $9.57 Pittsburgh $1-$17 $11.00 $9.67 $8.20 St. Louis $2-$24 $17.39 $15.47 $12.36
EASTAtlanta $1-$33 $19.08 $17.48 $17.48Florida $2-$28 $11.42 $11.42 $10.11 Montreal
$7-$33 $9.81 $9.81 $6.81 New York $1-$30 $19.66 $16.23 $13.06 Philadelphia $6-$20 $14.20
$11.02 $11.02 
With consumer confidence wavering and the possibility of baseball's ninth work stoppage,
since 1972, looming when the current collective bargaining agreement, between the players
and the owners, ends on October 31, 2001, how can Baseball keep from tearing itself apart
and disintegrating into the kind of labor strife that occurred in 1994? Many owners point
out the all-time attendance record baseball set in 2000, of 72.7 million, and the new
six-year, $2.5 billion Television contract just signed with Fox Sports as evidence of the
present strength and prosperity that Major League Baseball is enjoying. But, despite the
record set for total attendance, half of all Major League teams actually saw a decline in
attendance last year, and there are significant ticket-price increases scheduled for more
than a dozen teams, this year, that threaten to further diminish attendance. Furthermore,
the television ratings for last year's All-Star Game and World Series were the lowest
ever. All of these things combine to paint a grim picture for the future of Major League
Baseball in the 21st Century, but there are some possible solutions that have been
suggested by the Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics. The Panel was
charged, in 1999, to spend eighteen months studying the financial problems facing
baseball and to find ways to strengthen the financially weaker teams. They were led by
Yale University President Richard Levin, political columnist George F. Will, former
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and former Senate majority leader George Mitchell,
and consulted by 14 team owners and the players union. They developed five proposals to
help baseball face its financial challenges. The first was for the league to raise the
percentage of local revenue that is shared between the teams from 20 percent to 40
percent with the bulk of the money going to help the teams that are struggling
financially. Second, they suggested the creation of a 50 percent competitive balance tax
on payrolls that exceed $84 million. It would tax the teams on the money they spend
beyond $84 million, and that figure would remain fixed even as salaries continue to
climb. Third, the panel proposed the development of a competitive draft in which the
eight worst teams each year could select players not on any other team's 40-man roster.
The draft would include international players and eliminate free-agent compensation
picks. These are draft picks that teams get when another team signs a free agent away
from their team. Fourth, they suggested the establishment of an expanded central fund to
distribute pooled money from sources such as broadcast TV, the Internet, and product
licensing and allow the commissioner to allocate funds unevenly, if necessary. Finally
the panel advocated keeping strategic franchise relocation open as an option for teams
operating without any hope of competing in their current market. All of these suggestions
would most likely help to diminish the competitive imbalance that exists in Major League
Baseball today between the large market and small market franchises, but it is also
fairly unlikely that any of their proposals will be adopted any time in the near future.
Baseball owners are historically very stubborn and resistant to change, but with the
current situation baseball finds itself in, it may require unprecedented cooperation
among the owners, and also between the owners and the players union, in order to solve
the serious problems that face baseball in the near future. It is important that they
remember that Baseball had a very difficult time recovering from the last labor related
work stoppage it faced six years ago, and it will be even harder, if not impossible, to
recover if it happens again. Baseball owners cannot afford to be so selfish with their
own money that they force the poorer teams into financial ruin, and they also cannot
afford to alienate the fans that they depend on as the basis for all the money they all
make. 
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