FREE ESSAY ON THE UNITED STATES VS. THE WORLD : ISSUES CONCERNING A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

THE UNITED STATES VS. THE WORLD : ISSUES CONCERNING A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The debate over a National Missile Defense System first began in 1983 when President
Ronald Reagan introduced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). His ambitious plan to
defend the nation directly impacts every citizen of the United States, as well as many
countries across the globe. Any person interested in weapons technology, effects of the
Cold War, national security, or foreign relations should become familiar with this issue.
The foundation arguments of this issue are fairly easy to follow.
The twilight years of the Cold War brought about the unification of Germany, the signing
of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and more importantly the dismantling of
the Soviet Union - the central hub of communism. The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a
time of change. Gorbachev resigned from office in 1991, and it seemed that a modern
renaissance was taking place. But this rebirth and step towards "global harmony" resulted
from almost 50 years of battle. During these landmark victories for democracy, mankind
witnessed nuclear stockpiles, two wars in the name of communism (Vietnam and Korea), and
an industrial and technological race to the moon. Though many policies were formed and
treaties were signed, certain Cold War issues continue to shine. The Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), introduced by former president Ronald Reagan, truly exhibited the Cold
War paranoia felt around the world. Armed with lasers and advanced tracking systems, the
United States would be shielded from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) launched
by communist nations and their supporters. Until recently, Reagan's SDI had become an
idea of the past. It would seem that is no longer true. The United States has been trying
to advance the National Missile Defense (NMD) system since Reagan's proposal, and is
hoping to deploy the system in the next ten years. With questions of cost, effectiveness,
and the unfavorable reaction from old Cold War enemies, the United States is faced with a
dilemma - save national security or keep the delicate balance of power from exploding
into an arms race and possible war.
To begin analyzing and understanding this situation one must delve into the past and seek
the motivation behind the project. Reagan proposed the SDI in 1983, which coincidentally
was amid a massive Soviet Union stockpiling of nuclear warheads. According to the
National Resources Defense Council and as reported by CNN, the U.S.S.R increased its
nuclear warheads by approximately 20,000 in the span of ten years (1975-1985). During
that same time, the United States decreased their stockpile by 4,000 nuclear warheads. By
1985, the Soviet Union had 17,000 more warheads than the U.S. It's no wonder why Reagan
called for the SDI to begin.
But Reagan's plan for national defense was greeted by a contract of the past. On May 26,
1972, President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
L.I. Brezhnev, signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in Moscow. It is this treaty
which expressly denies the right to an ABM system. Article I of the ABM Treaty states,
"each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its
country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for
defense of an individual region except as provided…" This treaty was drafted to be
of benefit to both countries, and as a security measure. By ensuring that neither country
could construct an ABM system then neither country would have an unquestionable advantage
in time of war or peace.
With the Soviet Union dissolved, a question to the legality of the treaty has been
exposed. The treaty between the Soviet and the U.S., can not become a treaty between
Russia and the U.S. Because one party no longer exists, the treaty is void. Moreover,
"the President cannot, without Senate approval, bring a lapsed treaty back to life by
declaring that a given foreign state is the successor or continuation of an extinct
state" (Spencer 4). President Clinton has been accused of just that - attempting to
reinstate the treaty without the Senate. In an attack on the Clinton Administration and
their desire to amend and reinstate the ABM Treaty with Russia, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman, Jesse Helms, says, "It is clear that the United States is no longer
legally bound by the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty" (Thiessen 3). Russia argues that "Boris
Yeltsin expressed the willingness of Russia to step into the shoes of the Soviet Union
under the ABM Treaty" (Spencer 4). But who decides if Russia is the successor to the
Soviet? Despite Russian belief, many prominent U.S. officials continue to show why the
treaty may not be reinstated and should be thrown away. In a response to the ABM Treaty's
validity, Douglas Feith, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Negotiation policy in
the Department of Defense, has stated that "if a treaty has lapsed…it is
dead…[and] there is no resurrection in international law" (Spencer 4). 
Still, even if the treaty is allowed to remain valid, the treaty allows that each
country, "in exercising its national sovereignty, [has] the right to withdraw from this
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events…have jeopardized its supreme
interests…" (Article XV, ABM Treaty). Relinquishing responsibility to the treaty
then means that the other party has no obligation either. If the treaty only said that
both parties aren't allowed to build an ABM system, then giving up the treaty would not
be a terrible price to pay. The treaty, however, places strict limitations on ABM
technology. If the treaty were abandoned, then doors to destructively precise and
powerful ABM weapons would be opened.
Though production of ABM devices would likely be within the United States and Russia,
"other countries would feel free to develop as many offensive weapons as they wanted,
which would then set in motion a comparable dynamic to offset that with more missiles [in
the U.S.]" (Cohen 4). The involvement of outside 'rogue' nations will be spawned from the
very reason Reagan started the SDI - fear and paranoia. But there would be one difference
- the 'rogue' nations would actually be somewhat justified in armament manufacturing. If
the U.S. builds a NMD/ABM system to counter the 'rogue' threat, but all the ABM system
does is increase the 'rogues' stockpiles, in turn increasing threat, then the U.S. has
really only delayed the threat until the 'rogue' nations become better equipped
militarily. Following logic, this would mean that there would be a military standoff.
And, as history has taught us, a country with a standing army is ready for war. But
before this commonly accepted theory is analyzed one must ask, why would a small 'rogue'
nation even attempt to attack the United States and risk annihilation (Bethe)? It seems
that few to no leaders would doom their country to certain destruction. While relations
with foreign countries are important and necessary, the specifics of a National Missile
Defense system must be closely evaluated before any decisions are made rashly.
The issues of cost and effectiveness may be considered as vital to the ultimate
deployment decision as is the breaching or abandoning of the ABM Treaty. And, while cost
and effectiveness may be vital, they are also two issues that may not have been correctly
relayed to the public. The FY 2001 Military Budget requests $4.7 billion for Ballistic
Missile Defense, but just this year an addition of "$2.3 billion for National Missile
Defense deployment…" (FY 2001) was made. In May of 1995, the estimated amount spent
on a NMD system was $36 billion (Landay 1). Four months later, a "report by the
nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) [concluded] that the Pentagon poured at
least $70.7 billion into antimissile defense efforts in the decade that followed the 1983
launch of former President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative" (Landay 1, 9/95).
Though probably an attempt to make the government look as though it's hiding spending the
reality is that "most of [the taxpayers] money has gone to contractors and
consultants…" (Landay 2, 9/95). Regardless of what the exact amount of money spent
has been it is agreed that billions of dollars have been spent and will continue to be
spent. This is to be expected. If the government is going to get anything done it must
spend money, so long as it is not wasting money. Of course, that is the argument - the
government is wasting our money and those billions of dollars could have been used for
countless other programs to benefit society. Also, how much has ABM technology been
improved by spending over $70.7 billion, "[which] already represents the single biggest
expenditure in the Pentagon budget" (Thurman 1)? Was the money worth whatever advances
were made? This brings up the question of effectiveness.
According to Dr. Hans Bethe and fifty other Nobel-Prize laureates, in a letter to
President Clinton, "any movement towards deployment would be premature, wasteful and
dangerous" (6/6/00). Countless analogies and remarks about the government trying "to
shoot a bullet out of the sky with a bullet" (Thurman 1) have been made. The Defense
Secretary, William Cohen, acknowledges that "in order to have a technologically effective
system, we need the support of our allies" (Whitesides 1). This leads the public to
believe that American ingenuity is not enough for a working and successful ABM system.
Yet American ingenuity may be all we have. Along with "bitter objections from Russia and
China" (Whitesides 1), the ABM system has also "rattled some European allies" (Whitesides
1). With friends worrying about political repercussions, America will likely be alone in
this endeavor. So far the ABM system has been a system by and for America, but it has not
been a great success.
Since October, "two of three U.S. attempts to shoot down missiles over the
Pacific…have failed" (Aldinger 1). Moreover, this means that in the past decade,
"thirteen of 17 tests of antimissile interceptors…have failed" (Landay 2, 7/98).
This is not encouraging to the scientists and advocates of a NMD system. But Cohen says,
"these problems are correctable" (Whitesides 1) and that it was a "failure of the test,
but not the entire system" (Whitesides 1). There is a general consensus that if the
system were deployed now that it would be "premature, wasteful and dangerous" (Bethe).
The United States must choose between a limited missile defense system and harsh
political reactions from world neighbors; while taking into consideration the many pros
and cons of each issue within the issue. With such an important debate one will always
find evidence supporting every angle of the argument. In such a situation the debate
needs to be simplified. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona believes "our first responsibility is
to the defense of the American people" (Kyl 1), and most Americans would agree. But in
this case, is passivity better than an ABM strategy? As a capitalist it is easy to say
that only the strongest survive. But if Ghandi taught the world anything it is that the
person who exhibits non-violence through passive aggression, in the face of violence,
will have the last laugh. So, will the U.S. adopt Ghandi's beliefs as national policy?
The answer is probably not. A more important question to ponder is, will we as a nation
make the correct decision, and is there truly a right and wrong choice in this issue of
national defense?
Bibliography
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