FREE ESSAY ON WORLD WAR 1

WORLD WAR 1

World War I, the first globally destructive conflict that the Western Civilization
produced, has been the subject of various analysis, interpretations and reevaluations of
the various causes that led to it. Initially, the guilt was placed upon Germany and its
allies. Eventually, historical analysis conducted in decades after the event, lead to a
shift from the guilt perspective, to a broader one of various interacting factors.
Although almost nine decades have elapsed, one question still persists: Which explanation
is best suited as the cause of WWI?
To provide an answer, the views of six historians shall be considered. To begin, James
Joll's answer to the question will be examined. It will be seen that he considered
several factors that, according to him, interlinked and lead to the conflict. Five
additional explanatory models will be analyzed: those of historians Arno Mayer, Wolfgang
Mommsen, Donald Lammers, Micheal Gordon and Konrad Jarausch. They concentrated on more
specific issues as part of interpreting the causes of the conflict. 
In his 1980s book The Origins of the First World War, historian James Joll offers an
explanation linking the entire social, political and economic spectrum of 20th C. Europe.
First, he starts his search for a cause in the July Crisis of 1914.
The July 1914 crisis started with the diplomatic ultimatum that Austro-Hungary gave
Serbia. The rest of the European powers, galvanized in the various alliance systems,
where overwhelmed. Thus, Germany was offering unquestioned support to the Hapsburgs, even
if it was to be military, whilst knowing that the Russians were objecting to any use of
force against Serbia and threatening their intervention. France seemed confused, but was
ready to support Russian intervention against Austria-Hungary. Britain, pressured both by
France and Russia, was undecided until it officially announced its military support to
them. In the end, according to Joll, in July events were moving too fast for the
diplomats because the decisions were now more and more being taken by the soldiers. What
had started as a diplomatic crisis had resulted in military action.
The second causal factor offered by Joll is the Alliance System between the Great Powers.
Germany was thus allied with Austria-Hungary. France and Russia had their own pact.
Adding to these treaties, aiming for a Balance of Power, where the secret ententes
between England and France, and England and Russia. The result was a military and
political planning that depended, or was strengthened by this polarization of the two
camps: The Alliance and The Entente. The various treaties thus provided the framework
within which the diplomacy of the pre-war years was conducted. 
Thirdly, Joll analyzed pre-war militarism and strategic planning. Germany, militaristic,
had increased its naval program enough as to lead to a radical change in British
strategic thinking. The British were involved in the usual strategic planning aiming at
securing their access to the Empire and, in the end, the arms race contributed to the
feeling that war was inevitable. French militarism was aiming at increasing the draft
term, whereas the Russian military recovery from the 1905 loss to the Japanese was
alarming the Germans. All major powers had anticipated war, and the pre-war planning,
such as the Schlieffen Plan, exacerbated everything. The Powers were ready for the
conflict, had planned for it, and when the crisis came, diplomatic thinking was bypassed
by military critical readiness. 
Fourthly, Joll examined the importance of domestic policies, which, according to several
historians, could have influenced foreign policy decisions. Every Great Power was passing
through a political and social crisis in 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was losing its
geopolitical integrity; Britain had to deal with the Ulster Irish question that was about
to overspill; France had as issues taxation and the Three-Year service issue.
Nevertheless, Joll points out that domestic policies played a part, but not a big one as
to lead to war. Ultimately, politicians did not deliberately embarked on war as a way out
of their insoluble domestic, social and political problems. 
Economic rivalries were another factor that Joll examined. He indicated that not all
imperialistic policies were inspired by direct economic interests. Although economic
interest had often lead to strategic frictions between the Great Powers, in the end
economic interests were not too much [...] in the minds of the politicians in July 1914.
To minimize the role of economic calculations vis-a-vis a war, Joll indicated that the
opponents had not taken into account the economic consequences and needs of a war.
Governments thus did not embark on war in order to satisfy private or budgetary financial
interests.
Regarding Imperialism, Joll pointed out that, although it did increase in pace between
1880 and 1900, it was not the immediate cause for war. Britain had an Empire to defend;
Russia was pushing in the Middle East and was already present in Persia; Italy wanted to
live up to its glorious past and Germany wanted to create its own sea power, or
Weltpolitik. Yet, despite obvious opposing aims, the Great Powers were able to expand
while preserving peace. Joll thus mentions all the various treaties that the Great Powers
signed in the 19th C. and early 20th C. The only agreement that was not achieved, the
Anglo-German one, was still not enough to spark the war. An agreement would have been
achieved if the Germans had been prepared to abate their claims to naval hegemony and
world power. Joll thus concludes that imperialist policies had contributed to the frame
of mind in which decisions were taken , but the war itself was not caused by immediate
imperialist activities. The immediate cause, according to Joll, was to be found in the
attitudes of 1914.
The seventh factor evaluated by Joll, the Mood of 1914, was the cumulative result of 19th
C. nationalism and patriotism. Therefore, in all belligerent states the war was
unanimously accepted. Despite beliefs that socialists might determine workers not to
support the war effort, patriotism, inculcated at many levels of national life all over
Europe, prevailed. The youth had slowly been indoctrinated for war. Society itself was
familiar with the possibility of war. In the end, according to Joll, governments were
able to fight the war because their subjects accepted the necessity for it. Some people
believed that a war would solve internal problems. Others saw it as a solution for
external ones. Joll thus concludes that, ultimately, it was attitudes which made the war
possible. 
The author concluded his work admitting that, in a different time, a historian will see
causes from a different perspective. The following historians wrote in different decades
and approached the causes of WWI from different directions. 
In his article Domestic Causes of the First World War, Arno Mayer detached his analysis
from the usual multi-factor explanatory model, and focused instead on the role of
domestic policies in igniting the war. Mayer thus points to a pre-revolutionary state of
affairs in all of Europe, which lead to an intense interconnection of domestic politics
and foreign politics. In his analysis, Mayer points out that Germany's social issue
pushed politicians to want war in order to provide a solution to internal problems. In
Britain, France and Italy, liberalism [...] was heavily besieged whereas Russia had labor
problems to deal with. The solution, again, was war. Mayer concludes his article
indicating that failing to analyze the interconnection between domestic and foreign
policy is likely to leave a distorted picture [...] of the long-run and immediate causes
of the Great War... 
Wolfgang Mommsen's article The Debate on German War Aims revolves around the
controversial subject of Germany's immediate pre-war aims. Mommsen criticizes the work of
another historian, Fritz Fischer, who pointed out that Germany had a will to unlimited
world power. Mommsen refutes Fischer's claim that Germany was pursuing nothing but
imperialist aims and points out that the German Chancellor, Bethmann, was moderate and
not an annexationist. The author agrees that the military were more influential than the
politicians and points to a certain spirit of fatalism that made the Germans wait for the
war. Mommsen concludes his article implying that German aims can be found from a detailed
political, social and constitutional study of pre-war Germany.
In his article Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War: 1914, historian Donald
Lammers searched for answers in Britain. He criticizes one of Arno Mayer's articles in
which he attributed Britain's commitment to war as a move to avoid or solve internal
problems. Lammers thus points out that the Ulster problem was big, but not apocalyptic.
Socio-political tensions within Britain had split Liberal and Conservative views, yet
they both agreed on Britain's commitment to support France if she was attacked by
Germany. The determination to go to war did not emerge from domestic pressures, or one
party would have opposed war as a way to weaken the other one politically. Lammers
concludes that an answer to Britain's commitment is more likely to be found in Mayer's
own conclusions on Balance of Power and the security of the Empire, and not in the
internal socio-political turmoil.
Michael Gordon joined the causal debate with his article Domestic Conflict and the
Origins of the First World War, in which he compared pre-war Britain to Germany. First he
described foreign policy and concluded that Britain was hesitant, whereas Germany was
rash and aggressive. Secondly, by comparing domestic politics, Gordon concluded that both
Britain and Germany were on the eve of constitutional crisis, yet Germany contained more
social extremism within than Britain. With regards to the domestic-foreign policy link,
Gordon states that Germany's elites had an overwhelming incentive to use foreign policy
as a method for domestic control, whereas the British ones did not. To explain these
differences, Gordon's detailed comparison first points to economic factors: rate and form
of industrialization and international implications. Britain had developed early both
industrially and socially; Germany had been rushed through this process in just decades
and was thus in turmoil. Another factor was different between the two states:
governmental institutions. The British solved political problems within the parliament;
the Germans diverted them in foreign policy. Nationalism was also different between the
states, just as their politics were. The final conclusion Gordon arrived at was that, all
things considered, domestic politics had clear impacts on the foreign policy of the
states. Britain grew defensive and weary, whereas Germany grew fearful of international
specters in addition to following a domestic propaganda program aimed at diluting
internal problems.
Konrad Jarausch pursued a conciliatory explanation of Germany's Chancellor, Theobald von
Bethmann, and his immediate pre-war decisions. In the article The Illusion of Limited
War, Jarausch described Bethmann as an optimistic politician who was hoping for a
breakthrough. The Chancellor supported Austria but, considering Britain's silence,
believed in a localized European war, similar to the Balkan one of 1913. Eventually,
according to the author, the Chancellor lost effective control of the events as the
military influence, the Bismarckian legacy, bypassed civilian decision taking. He
realized too late, that what Germany had risked was, in fact, a full continental war.
Jarausch thus concludes that Bethmann did not enter the war as a rabid pan-German
expansionist, but as a traditional nationalist. 
The explanatory models presented by these five historians have the undeniable quality of
elaborating and detailing complementary explanations about the origins of the WWI. Even
if many historians have not spent time analyzing Bethmann's decision making process as
Jarausch did, his research reasonably exculpates the Chancellor from beliefs that he
pursued annexationist policies. Gordon's comparative article of Germany with Britain
produces one of the most efficient analysis in understanding why Germany and Britain
took, in a moment of crisis, radically different decisions. Donald Lammers also used a
socio/political comparison of Britain and Germany in order to conclude that all the
evidence is insufficient to attribute input guilt to the socio/political differences
between the states. Mommsen's article had as aim to eliminate as a causal explanation
German imperialistic aims and the argumentation is convincing in that respect. Regarding
Mayer, he clearly attributed a large causal role to domestic policies within the Great
Powers and presents compelling evidence to that effect. Ultimately, these explanatory
models do not present a clear view as to the cause of the war, as much as they elaborate
on individual factors believed to have contributed to its start. The complex European
problems of 1914 make it quite difficult to discern a clear view as to what ignited WWI.
Historians have thus been forced to work by elimination of improbable causes and by
researching bit by bit the various socio/political/economic/cultural aspects of early
20th C. Europe in order to complete the larger, explanatory puzzle. WWI, its arrival and
devastating effects, truly was a mind boggling Gordian Knot, for the events shattered all
positive beliefs and hopes of the Western Civilization. Joll's work is thus an efficient
multi spectral analysis. The additional explanatory models, although they are sometimes
contradictory, complement each other in providing the future historian, and any reader,
with an answer as to what caused WWI. Which explanatory model, however, seems to provide
the best answers as to the cause?
Joll's analysis of militarism, strategic planning and militarism, provide the best
explanation as to what ignited WWI, whereas Lammers' model is a good counter balance for
Mayer's domestic policy explanation and explains what did not spark the conflict. The
influence of domestic problems upon foreign policy, such a the Russian social turmoil,
the Ulster problem in Britain, the pending constitutional crisis in Germany, the French
tax and draft problem, not forgetting the Austrian nationality problems, existed but was
not sufficient in starting the war. Beginning with the 18th C., European states have
faced, at one moment or another, simultaneous domestic problems that have not
significantly influence foreign policies. The War of the Austrian Succession, the 7
Years' War, the Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War and the Franco Prussian war all had a
common causal factor, and it was not primarily a domestic/foreign policy link. During all
these mentioned wars, there were certain domestic problems affecting each of the
belligerents in smaller or higher degrees, but they did not led to conflicts. Economic
and domestic problems may have dictated the ignition time of the war, such as 1914
instead of 1913 or 1919. However, they did not cause the war, for the common factor to
all theses conflicts, as well as WWI, that inevitably lead to them was Imperialism
Imperialism, the policy of extending a country's influence over less powerful states, has
shadowed any state's consolidation at all times. The Chinese, Egyptians, Assyrians,
Persians, Greeks, Romans, Mongols, Spanish, Portuguese, British, Ottomans, French,
Russians and Germans all aimed at imposing their own economic, cultural, political and
social views to less powerful states. The only historic reality, often overlooked, is the
fact that the last six mentioned empires all developed and expanded in the same time
frame, and grew around a geographical basin that used to be controlled by only one or two
powers. European Imperialism went through its expansionist phase form the 16th C until
the 1890s. In the 19th C., influenced by the Industrial Revolution, European Imperialism
adopted new terminologies: search for materials, market creation, commercial expansion,
civilizing mission etc. It nevertheless remained the same, except that, in 1890, it
entered a new phase: displacement. 
Joll was incorrect in minimizing the role of Imperialism as a factor for WWI. The Great
Powers truly grew while preserving peace, but, as of 1890, the Great Powers almost
stopped growing. Expansionism became displacement. The reality was that all geographical
areas that could be colonized or incorporated in spheres of influence, such as Africa,
China and Latin America, had been fully partitioned. 1890 is the starting point for
displacement: to expand further, an empire must displace another physically. It is the
last stage before armed conflict, and it has always been characterized by an increase in
alliances, by a weapons race, by national indoctrination and by a diversion of attention
from domestic problems toward foreign factors. A typical example of displacement
Imperialism would be the 2nd Punic War, which had Romans and Carthaginians go through pre
war social/economic and political concerns. The reality was, however, that for the Roman
commonwealth to expand, it had to displace Carthaginian power. Interestingly, the Romans
were claiming to defend the Commonwealth's interests and future survival by fighting
farther and farther abroad.
European Imperialism was to be kept in check by Balance of Power principles and various
treaties. The British thus settled the Persian and Afghanistan issues with the Russians.
The Germans consolidated their southern flank with an alliance with Austro-Hungary. The
French wanted to resist the Germans by allying themselves with Britain and Russia. The
Triple Alliance and The Entente were formed. At this point, however, Balance of Power was
no longer the issue as it had been at Vienna in 1815. At stake was nothing less then
strategic thinking, which, although well described by Joll, is not clearly identified as
a tool of Imperialism. Joll contradicted his model by splitting militarism and strategic
thinking from Imperialism, and giving them various degrees of causal responsibility. In
realty, 19th C European militarism and strategic thinking were subservient to
Imperialism. The agreements mentioned above had the following aims:
First, Russia had to prevent its Empire from colliding with the British Empire in the
Middle East for it risked loosing on the battlefield what it could gain by negotiating.
After 1905 it had to recover its Imperial prestige and prevent defeats that could lead to
a loss of glory and possible emergence of regional nationalism and territorial
disintegration . Secondly, Austria-Hungary, more developed then Russia, had to deal with
modern nationalism and disintegration of its Empire in the 1900s, just as Russia would in
the 1990s. At stake, again was the preservation of its empire. Thirdly, Germany, the
youngest Great Power, was going through an economic accelerated growth upon a
socio-political structure unable to keep up. The Junkers' 18th C. Imperialist values
still persisted and reflected German nationalist policies but especially Prussian
aristocratic aims. Bismarck did not just create a large Germany in 1871: he expanded
Prussia over the rest of the German States thus creating the 2nd Reich. In 1900, Prussian
imperialism, aiming at a Weltpolitik, was following similar patterns to those of 18th C.
Britain except that it could no longer just expand, it had to displace other powers, and
not just any powers, but French and British ones, in order to further grow. Fourthly,
France, the second largest empire in the World, had to recover the national prestige lost
in 1871, as well as Alsace Lorraine, in addition to preserving an Empire that seemed to
be an easy prey to German militarism. Aggressive colonialism in Africa, in Senegal and
Algeria, while shadowing close by German movements, was an indication that France was not
willing to be displaced as an imperial power. Fifthly, regarding Britain, its case is
simple to interpret: with or without domestic problems, its empire had to be protected.
The Ulster problem did not affect the 1914 decisions, as it did not affect many others
until the present day. Britain secured strategic alliances and pursued military
developments that were going to prevent it from being displaced from anywhere and by
anyone. In 1914 the threat was no longer coming from Russia or France, but from Germany.
Finally, Turkey was trying to hang on to what it had. It failed.
In all the previous cases, Imperialism was the main concern, whether conscious, or
subconscious. The very rapid spread of the war from a continental scale to a global one
is an indication of the true nature of the clash: neighboring empires had ran out of
expanding space. Two empires never have and never will grow side by side because of their
very nature. One, or both, will be conquered. The only factor that, if it had not been
present in 1914 Europe, there would have been no war, was Imperialism. The arms race,
nationalism, strategic alliances, economic rivalries were in fact long term subservient
effects of Imperialism. Even the attitudes of 1914 were a normal, 200 year old, organic
growth of the belief that the empires had to be preserved or expanded. Nationalism and
social Darwinism were no small causes in sustaining the belief in imperial prestige.
Soldiers joined to fight for their Emperors and Empires, for glory and for adventure. 
Was Imperialism alone responsible of the global conflict? No, for Imperialism, in itself,
is a multi spectral entity, if one may call it so. As previously mentioned, it concludes
social, economic, political and cultural factors. By force opening China to the market,
Britain asserted economic imperialism. By sending the 23d Welsh Regiment against the
Zulus, it aimed at military imperialism. The political control of Asian states throughout
the 19th C. represented political imperialism, just as much as the German move at
Tangiers in 1906. The cultural aspects of Imperialism are visible from the claims of
civilizing primitive people. In all cases foreign policy will be employed as the means to
achieving all goals with the least amount of costs. But domestic problems, unless one is
referring to a civil war or anarchy, have a smaller influence upon foreign policy then
expansionist aims might have. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty was purely imperialist: Germany
had finally obtained, for a short duration, agricultural and East European resources it
wanted for so long. Furthermore, the distribution of the German colonies amongst France
and Britain clearly points to Imperialism as well. Was WWI started by domestic factors
just to culminate in imperial annexations? No. Like any 16th to 20th C. major European
war, it was based upon Imperialism and saw the spoils distributed amongst the victorious
empires. The war saw the collision of six empires separated in two camps. WWII had at its
center the 3d Reich and was, to a certain extent, the continuation of unfinished business
of 1919. The Cold War continued the imperialistic trend as Communism and Western
Capitalism collided ideologically, as each one wanted to displace the other. Imperialism
is, again, the geographical, political, economical and cultural expansion of one's state
or commonwealth's influence over another state, regardless of its current stage of
development. From time to time it even implies that one empire will have to step over
another. 
Could WWI have been prevented? No, for WWI logically followed three centuries of
aggressive European expansionism. The war had been thought and planned for well before
1914. The moods of the people were largely the product of a subconscious eagerness for an
aggressive war and a century of nationalist/patriotic indoctrination. By the time
civilians were rejoicing in the capitals, the war had already started, as orders had been
issued days before and the troops were already proceeding towards their initial
objectives. A war in 1914 might have been prevented; a World War could not. After 1900,
any European war, nothing new in itself, would have spilled all over the European
dominated planet. Earth itself had become the battlefield. Two more wars followed: WWII
and the Cold War. By the third one, war itself was the enemy, for there could be no
winner. In 1900 European empires could produce enough ships and ammunition to fight over
the entire planet. They did. In 1896, as a young Bostonian engineer was looking for work,
a friend told him: Invent something that will allow those bloody Europeans to kill the
hell out of each other! Two years later, demonstrating his new toy in front of an
exhilarated British General Staff, Browning fired non-stop hundreds of rounds through the
world's first belt fed, gas operated and water cooled machine gun. 16 years later,
serving with all European nations, the Browning machine gun design was killing hundreds
of thousands. HOMO HOMINI LVPVS EST, and yes, war was coming for the European empires.
One may thus conclude that the research of various historians is, overall, vital in
assembling the large puzzle that details the causes of the conflict. Despite certain
contradictions, all models complement each other and offer pros and cons that differ from
one generation to another but provide insights into the people and mentality of 1914
Europe. Joll's approach to Militarism and Imperialism is a good, but incomplete
explanatory model of the causes of WWI. It is incomplete because it has separated
elements that should have been regrouped in one category: Imperialism. He did not
recognize Militarism and strategic planning as Imperialist agents. Although Imperialism
has been given in this essay a large share of responsibility, it has been so because by
itself, Imperialism was a multi factor cause for WWI. All things considered, it is the
only variable which, if removed, would seriously question the possibility of the conflict
occurring.
Bibliography
James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (London: Longman, 1984) p30.
Ibid., p. 55.
Ibid., p. 63.
Ibid., p. 75.
Ibid., p. 92.
Ibid., p. 119.
Ibid., p. 124.
Ibid., p. 140.
Ibid., p.141.
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 167.
Ibid., p. 184.
Ibid., p. 196.
Ibid., p. 196.
Arno Mayer, Domestic Causes of the First World War, The Responsibility of Power, (1967),
p. 287. 
Ibid., p. 291.
Ibid., p. 300.
Wolfgang Mommsen, The Debate on German War Aims, Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (July
1966), p. 56.
Donald Lammers, Arno Mayer and the British Decision for War: 1914, Journal of British
Studies, 12 (May 1973), p. 164.
Michael Gordon, Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and
the German Cases, Journal of Modern History, 46 (June 1974), p. 197.
Ibid., p. 201.
Konrad H. Jarausch, The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's Calculated
Risk, July 1914, Central European History, 2 (March 1969), p. 54.
Ibid., p. 76.
Oxford Reference Encyclopedia (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 691.